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Issues in the Third Circuit
"I CAN'T WORK JUST KIDDING, I CAN.": THE EFFECTS THAT
APPLYING FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS HAVE ON AN ADA CLAIM
I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was signed into law on
July 26, 1990 by President George Bush.' A primary purpose of the ADA is
to protect disabled persons from discrimination in the workplace.2 This
law followed various government initiatives designed to compensate dis-
abled individuals due to their inability to provide for themselves.3 These
initiatives included the Social Security Act, workers compensation pro-
grams and various disability insurance plans.
4
1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (providing amended version of stat-
ute); Anne E. Beaumont, This Estoppel Has Got to Stop:Judicial Estoppel and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1529, 1541 (1996) (discussing history of
ADA); Richard C. Mariani & Kimberly E. Robertson, Representation of Total Disability
on Claims for Social Security Benefits: Powerful, But Not Conclusive Evidence that the
Claimant Is Not a Qualified Individual with a Disability Under the ADA, 29 U. MEM. L.
REv. 651, 653-54 (1999) (describing basis of ADA law).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (3) (stating "discrimination against individuals
with disabilities persists in such crucial areas as employment"); Christine Neylon
O'Brien, To Tell the Truth: Should Judicial Estoppel Preclude Americans with Disabilities
Act Complaints?, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 349, 360-64 (1999) (analyzing purpose and
requirements of ADA). See generally Heather Hamilton, Judicial Estoppel, Social Se-
curity Disability Benefits and the ADA: The Circuits Diverge, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 127
(1996) (stating Congress' intent to address disabled persons in workforce).
3. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Guidance on the Ef-
fect of Applications for Disability Benefits on ADA Claims, EEOC NOTICE 915.002,
6907, 5419-24 (Feb. 12, 1997) (discussing Social Security, workers' compensation
and disability insurance plans) [hereinafter EEOC]; Beaumont, supra note 1, at
1545-50 (discussing purposes of Social Security and workers' compensation laws);
Maureen C. Westman, The Road Best Traveled: Removing Judicial Roadblocks that Pre-
vent Workers from Obtaining Both Disability Benefits and ADA Civil Rights Protections, 26
HOFSTRA L. REv. 377, 388-395 (1997) (discussing purposes behind various disabil-
ity subsistence benefits).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3) (B) (1994) (defining disability); EEOC, supra
note 3, at 5419 ("In adding disability as a basis for benefits administered by the
Social Security Administration (SSA) in 1956, Congress recognized society's obliga-
tion to provide assistance to people whose disabilities prevent them from achieving
economic self-sufficiency."); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 2301, 2304 (1995)
(defining personal injury and requiring employers to pay workers' compensation
to employees injured during course of employment); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36
(West 1986) (defining disability for workers' compensation purposes); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 53:5A-10 (West 1986) (showing example of disability insurance plan); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (West 1992) (defining injury for purposes of workers'
compensation); EEOC, supra note 3, at 5422 ("The workers' compensation defini-
tions of 'disability' reflect the purposes of workers' compensation laws. Those laws
provide a system for securing prompt and fair settlement of employees' claims
(627)
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When analyzing ADA claims, courts have used the tests and burdens
of proof that developed under other anti-discrimination laws. 5 One signif-
icantly litigated issue occurs when a plaintiff, claiming to be "disabled" and
unable to work, applies for disability payments (i.e., social security) and
subsequently files an ADA claim stating that he or she was discriminated
against because of this disability. 6 The apparent conflict exists between
claiming to be unable to work under the disability statute and then filing
an ADA claim, which requires the plaintiff to prove that he or she is quali-
fied and able to do the job.7 Courts often used judicial estoppel to pre-
vent a plaintiff from maintaining an ADA claim after that same plaintiff
had applied for disability benefits and claimed to be unable to work.8
Part II of this Brief will look at the background of the ADA, disability
statutes and the Third Circuit's prior use of judicial estoppel under ADA
claims where those plaintiffs had also applied for disability payments. 9
Part III will discuss the United States Supreme Court's recent ruling on
this issue, as well as the Third Circuit's subsequent interpretation of that
Supreme Court holding. 10 Finally, Part IV will give a practical analysis of
how attorneys should deal with the issue ofjudicial estoppel in Third Cir-
cuit ADA cases.1 1
II. BACKGROUND
A. Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA was enacted to rectify the problem of discrimination against
disabled persons in the workplace. 12 The ADA prevents employers from
against employers for occupational injury and illness."); Id. at 5423 ("The purpose
of disability insurance plans is to provide partial wage replacements when an em-
ployee becomes unable to work as a result of illness, injury, or disease.").
5. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 517 (1993) (discussing
procedures of Title VII discrimination case); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (discussing burden shifting under Tide VII); Mariani &
Robertson, supra note 1, at 655-56 (showing that ADA claims use same shifting of
burdens and procedures as other discrimination statutes).
6. See, e.g., McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) (discuss-
ing judicial estoppel of ADA claim).
7. See id. at 618 (showing court's belief that statements are inconsistent).
8. See id. (applying judicial estoppel to prevent inconsistent statements).
9. For a discussion of the historical background of the ADA, disability statutes
and case law on judicial estoppel, see infra notes 12-57 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's recent stance on
the issue ofjudicial estoppel in ADA cases, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit's recent interpretation of that Supreme Court holding, see
infra notes 58-133 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of how practitioners in the Third Circuit should analyze
this issue, see infra notes 134-65 and accompanying text. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (a) (3) (1994) (stating "discrimination against individuals with disabilities
persists in such critical areas as employment").
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (3) (1994) (stating "discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment").
[Vol. 45: p. 627
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discriminatorily hiring or firing disabled persons.1 3 The statute strikes a
balance between unfair prejudice against the disabled, and the employer's
right to maintain high levels of productivity and employ a competent
workforce. 14 The ADA accomplishes this balance by requiring the em-
ployer to make "reasonable accommodations" to allow a disabled person
to perform the "essential functions" of a job.1 5 Although, there has been
much litigation as to what constitutes a "disability," "reasonable accommo-
dation" and "essential function," those issues are not pertinent to the pre-
sent discussion.
16
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) ("No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such indi-
vidual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or dis-
charge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment."); Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at
653 (discussing basic purpose and standards of ADA).
14. See Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at 655 ("Indeed, a person unable
to work is not intended to be, and is not, covered by the ADA." (citing McNemar v.
Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996))).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A) (making discrimination in workplace ap-
plicable when employer fails to make reasonable accommodations for disabled em-
ployees); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 362 (discussing balance that ADA makes). One
commentator summarized the balance and conflict between unlawful ADA dis-
crimination and an employer's right to effectively run his or her business as
follows:
Under its employment provisions, the ADA allows a disabled person to
sue an employer for failure to hire, or for termination from a present job,
based on disability discrimination. It is difficult, however, to argue that a
person who cannot walk, cannot talk, cannot see, is frequently ill, or even
frequently depressed, does not have an impediment to job performance.
Therefore, the ADA restricts its coverage to those cases where the em-
ployer's prejudice can be clearly distinguished from the actual dimin-
ished job performance of the disabled. The tool for making this
determination is the concept of "reasonable accommodation."
Id.; accord 42 U.S.C § 12111(9) (defining and giving examples of what constitutes
"reasonable accommodation" under ADA).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (giving examples of reasonable accommoda-
tions). The statute states:
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include-making existing fa-
cilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals
with disabilities; and job restructuring, part-time or modified work sched-
ules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of exami-
nations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers
or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
Id.; see Hamlin v. Charter Township, 165 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing
whether front-line fire fighting is essential function of job of firefighter); Smith v.
Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing whether
reassignment is reasonable accommodation); Pack v. KMart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300,
1305 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 45 (1999) (disagreeing with EEOC
definition of disability); Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 56-57 (1st Cir.
1998) (discussing whether shift rotation was essential function of nursing);
Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 783 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998) (sup-
porting EEOC's definitions of disability); Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265,
3
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The mechanics of an ADA claim follow the procedures of most anti-
discrimination statutes.17 The plaintiffs prima facie case "must establish
that: (1) he has a disability; (2) he is qualified for the position and can
perform the essential functions of the position with or without a reasona-
ble accommodation; and (3) the employer discriminated against him be-
cause of the disability."' 8 The burden of production then shifts to the
defendant employer to produce evidence of a nondiscriminatory business
reason for the employment decision.1 9 If the employer succeeds, then the
burden of proof shifts back to the employee to show that the employer's
reason was a "pretext" for discrimination. 20 In order to establish pretext,
the employee must show that the employer's explanation is false, and that
the real motivation for the decision was discrimination.
2 1
B. Disability Statutes
The most common disability statute used to judicially estop ADA
claims was the Social Security Act ("SSA").22 Other types of disability stat-
utes include workers' compensation laws and disability insurance plans.
23
While these statutes may have been created for different purposes and use
different criteria than the SSA, they bring up the same issues and
1272 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussing issue of reasonable accommodation), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1144 (1999); EEOC COMPLIANCE MANuAL § 902 (defining disability for
ADA purposes); Dennis Levandoski & Sheila Zakren, Has the ADA Got Your Client
Covered?, TRIAL, Oct. 1999, at 35-41 (discussing generally disagreement between
courts as to defining "disabilities," "essential functions" and "reasonable
accommodations").
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) ("The powers, remedies, and procedures set
forth in [Title VII] shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures [of the ADA].");
Levandoski & Zakren, supra note 16, at 38 (noting ADA procedure mirrors Title
VII, but noting ADA cases may place heavier burden on employers).
18. Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at 655 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
19. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993) (identifying
test for Title VII claim); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01
(3d Cir. 1997) (using burden-shifting articulated in Hicks for ADA claim), cert. de-
nied, 120 S. Ct. 1718 (2000); Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at 655 (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801).
20. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509-10 (developing "pretext" procedure); Krouse, 126
F.3d at 500-01 (endorsing Hicks pretext analysis for ADA claim).
21. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509 (establishing how to prove "pretext"); Krouse,
126 F.3d at 500-01 (adopting Hicks for ADA claim); Mariani & Robertson, supra
note 1, at 656 ("To establish pretext, the plaintiff must come forth with sufficient
evidence to show that (1) a discriminatory reason motivated the employer rather
than the employer's proffered legitimate reason; or (2) the defendant's proffered
explanation is 'unworthy of credence.'").
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1994) (establishing Social Security program).
23. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 2301, 2304 (1995) (requiring workers' com-
pensation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36 (West 1988) (defining disability for workers'
compensation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:5A-10 (West 1986) (showing example of disa-
bility insurance plan); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (West 1992) (defining injury for
purposes of workers' compensation).
4
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problems regarding judicial estoppel under the ADA,2 4 Disability pro-
grams are established to provide income to those individuals who are una-
ble to work for themselves. 25 Commentators have urged that statutes like
the SSA were set up in accordance with stereotypical notions depicting
disabled persons as inferior and unable to provide for themselves. 26 This
characterization contrasts with the ADA's purpose of giving disabled indi-
viduals the equal opportunity to work and provide for themselves.
27
To receive some type of social security payment (Social Security Disa-
bility Insurance, "SSDI," or Supplemental Security Income, "SSI"), an indi-
vidual must show that his or her physical or mental impairment is "of such
severity that [he or she] is not only unable to do [his or her] previous
work but cannot, considering [his or her] age, education, and work expe-
rience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy ... ."28 For administrative purposes, the SSA's ap-
plication process has a five-step inquiry, which allows for general presump-
24. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 800-05 (1999) (dis-
cussing judicial estoppel of ADA claim regarding Social Security benefits); Motley
v. NewJersey State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing judicial
estoppel of ADA claim regarding prior disability insurance plans); Krouse, 126 F.3d
at 498 (discussing judicial estoppel of ADA claims in regards to workers' compen-
sation); EEOC, supra note 3, at 5418 ("The definitions of the terms used in the
Social Security Act, state workers' compensation laws, disability insurance plans,
and other disability benefits programs are tailored to the purposes of those laws
and programs. Therefore, representations made under those laws and programs
are not determinative of coverage under the ADA.").
25. See EEOC, supra note 3, at 5419 (" [The Social Security Act's] purpose is to
provide a basic level of financial support for people who, because of disability,
cannot support themselves."). The purposes of workers' compensation laws are
similar. See id. at 5422 (discussing purpose of workers' compensation laws is to
provide prompt compensation for employees injured at work). The purposes of
disability statutes also do not mirror the purposes of the ADA. See id. at 5423 ("The
purpose of disability insurance plans is to provide partial wage replacement when
an employee becomes unable to work as a result of illness, injury, or disease.").
26. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 360 (discussing history of SSA). One com-
mentator discussed the somewhat stereotypical justification for SSDI as follows:
[D]isabled individuals were institutionalized and treated as deranged or
incompetent, a practice which continued well into the 1970s. The dis-
abled were included with the homeless, the desperately poor, and the
insane, as objects of charity for whom society had an obligation to provide
support. Not until 1956 did the government add those with disabilities to
the Social Security programs through the creation of SSDI. This program
did not radically depart from the historic presumptions and stereotypes
about the disabled. It provided federal financial assistance to those who,
by accident of birth, trauma, or disease, were unable to provide for
themselves.
Id.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (listing findings and purposes of Congress in
enacting ADA); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 361 (noting purpose of SSA was "not to
rectify employment misunderstandings").
28. Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at 657; accord 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d) (2) (A) (1994) (defining what level of disability is needed to obtain Social
Security benefits).
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tions as to whether an individual is disabled under the statute. 29 Under
this inquiry, there is no factual assessment of the disabilities of each indi-
vidual or of the essential functions or requirements of each particular
job.3 0 For example, an individual who has the HIV virus or is blind has a
"listed" disability under the five-step analysis and is automatically eligible
for disability payments. 31 There is also no inquiry into whether the appli-
cant's former employer can make "reasonable accommodations" so as to
allow the applicant to continue employment.3 2 These are just a few exam-
ples illustrating that the purposes, procedures and definitions used in
other disability statutes do not necessarily mirror those of the ADA.
33
29. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1999) (giving five-step analysis to be used by
Social Security Administration in determining whether applicant should be
granted Social Security benefits); EEOC, supra note 3, at 5520-21 (listing five ques-
tions to be asked in application for benefits); Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at
657-58 (describing application evaluation). Specifically, the five-step analysis asks:
(1) Is the claimant currently engaging in "substantial gainful activity"? (If
the answer is yes, the claim is denied; if the answer is no, the claim contin-
ues to the next step.)
(2) Does the claimant have a "severe" impairment? (If the answer is no,
the claim is denied; if the claimant has an impairment that significantly
limits his/her ability to work-that is, it is "severe"-the claim continues
to step 3.)
(3) Does the claimant have an impairment that is equivalent to any im-
pairment the SSA has listed as so severe that it automatically preclude
substantial gainful activity? (If the claimant has an impairment that is
medically the equivalent of a listed impairment, the claimant is presumed
disabled by the SSA and benefits are granted; if the claimant does not
have a listed impairment, the claim proceeds to step 4.)
(4) Does the impairment prevent the claimant from performing his/her
.past relevant work"? (If the claimant can perform his/her past relevant
work, the claim is denied; if the claimant cannot perform such work, the
claim continues to step 5.)
(5) Does the impairment prevent the claimant from performing any
other type of work? (If the SSA determines that the claimant is able to
perform work which exists in the national economy, the claim is denied;
if the SSA determines that the claimant is unable to perform other work,
considering his/her age, education, and past work experience, benefits
are granted.)
EEOC, supra note 3, at 5420-21.
30. See EEOC, supra note 3, at 5415-16 (discussing non-fact specific generaliza-
tions used under SSA that are in contrast to factual inquiries made under ADA).
31. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §§ 2.00(A), 14.00(D) (listing visual
impairments and HIV infections as diseases that automatically allow Social Security
benefits to be awarded).
32. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 803 (1999) (stating
major difference between ADA cases and SSA decision is that SSA does not analyze
issue of "reasonable accommodation").
33. See generally EEOC, supra note 3 (discussing justifications for abandoning
use of judicial estoppel in ADA claims).
[Vol. 45: p. 627
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C. Historical Use of Judicial Estoppel of ADA Claims in the Third Circuit
The language of the ADA is silent regarding the significance of a
plaintiffs assertions of total disability under another statute.3 4 Thus, the
courts are left to resolve the apparent conflict between the statutes: the
plaintiff, on the one hand, wants social security disability payments be-
cause he or she is unable to work and, on the other hand, claims that he or
she was discriminated against because he or she is able to work.35 The
circuit courts have used different versions of judicial estoppel, or "preclu-
sion of inconsistent positions," to dismiss ADA claims because of the ap-
parent conflict.3 6 This section takes a brief look at how the Third Circuit
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-17 (1994) (failing to indicate Congress' intent as to
effect of prior assertions of disability on ADA claims).
35. See Westman, supra note 3, at 401 ("[The SSA and ADA] statutes... are
silent as to their impact on each other.").
36. See Wilson v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.3d 500, 503-05 (7th Cir. 1999) (estop-
ping claim because of inconsistent positions, but noting SSA application does not
conclusively result in estoppel); Flowers v. Komatsu Mining Sys., Inc., 165 F.3d 544,
557 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding benefits not relevant to this particular ADA case);
McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1998)
(using "rebuttable presumption" standard); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp.,
120 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1998) (creating "rebuttable presumption" standard),
rev'd, 526 U.S. 795, 802-06 (1999); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376,
381-82 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding ADA claims not automatically barred because of
prior disability statement), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1144 (1999); Downs v. Hawkeye
Health Serv., Inc., 148 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 1998) (requiring "strong counter-
vailing evidence" of being qualified individual when prior statement seems contra-
dictory); Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 139 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1998)
(holding plaintiff's evidence could not overcome prior statement of being unable
to work), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 589 (1999); Johnson v. Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361,
1369 (9th Cir. 1998) (denying plaintiffs claim because of inconsistent claims
under summary judgement, but noting judicial estoppel may be appropriate when
plaintiff's inconsistent statements "amount to an affront of the court"); Aldrich v.
Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding payment of private
disability benefits does not automatically bar ADA claim, but may be relevant to
determining plaintiff's status as "qualified individual"); Rascon v. US West Commu-
nications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding SSA benefits don't
automatically estop ADA claim, but are relevant); Taylor v. Food World, Inc., 133
F.3d 1419, 1423 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating use of judicial estoppel depends on par-
ticular facts of each case including specific statements made in disability benefits
application); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997)
(discussing disagreement over judicial estoppel in realm of ADA claims); Blanton
v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 123 F.3d 916, 917 (6th Cir. 1997) (refusing to adopt per se
use ofjudicial estoppel); McCreary v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 132 F.3d 1159, 1164
(7th Cir. 1997) (finding disability claim is not conclusive in estopping ADA claim);
Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding benefits
relevant, but not conclusive and denied use of estoppel); Dush v. Appleton Elec.
Co., 124 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 1997) (prior statement showed plaintiff was unable
to work for ADA purposes); Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir.
1997) (holdingjudicial estoppel in ADA claim is not automatically used because of
prior disability statement, but depends on facts of each case); Swanks v. Washing-
ton Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding sworn
statement as to disability was relevant to case, but not relevant for purposes of
summary judgment), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 614 (1999); D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs.
Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996) (refusing to estop plaintiff); McNemar v. Disney
20001 CASEBRIEF 633
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used judicial estoppel to deal with the conflicting statements made under
the ADA and disability statutes.
3 7
Judicial estoppel was developed to "protect the integrity of the courts
by 'preventing parties from playing fast and loose with the courts in assum-
ing inconsistent positions."' 38 The Third Circuit developed a two-part in-
Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996) (estopping plaintiff's ADA claim);
Budd v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., 103 F.3d 699, 700 (8th Cir. 1996) (granting summary
judgment against plain'tiff because SSDI application demonstrated he was unable
to work); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (granting
summary judgment because plaintiff's SSDI application and doctor's testimony in-
dicated an inability to work); August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 584
(1st Cir. 1992) (granting summary judgment against plaintiff bound by statements
made for disability benefits); Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190,1196 (7th Cir. 1992)
(refusing to use judicial estoppel because SSA statute and ADA can coexist, though
SSA claim is relevant to determine seriousness of handicap); Mariani & Robertson,
supra note 1, at 665-72 (discussing circuit split). One commentator summarized
the difference of opinion as follows:
[T] he ADA and the SSA, when read together, appear to clearly provide a
"window" for some persons to pursue claims under the ADA-despite
having represented that they are "totally disabled," as they must, to qual-
ify for SSA benefits. While there did not seem to be any real dispute
among the circuits as to whether this window existed, there was a dispute
as to how wide open it should be. On the one side, the Third and Fifth
Circuits considered the window to be barely cracked. On the other side,
the District of Columbia Circuit, like the EEOC, considered the window
to be wide open. The First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits took positions in between the two sides.
Id. at 665-66; accord Hamilton, supra note 2, at 137-49 (discussing circuit split by
categorizing circuits into three approaches); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 353 n.21
(noting various circuit approaches to EEOC's position that judicial estoppel
should not be used);Jorge M. Leon, Note, Two Hats, One Head: Reconciling Disability
Benefits and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 1139, 1147-
53 (1997) (discussing disagreement among circuits).
37. See, e.g., Krouse, 126 F.3d at 498; McNemar, 91 F.3d at 616-19.
38. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 134-35 (citing McNemar); see Lawrence B. So-
lum, Caution! Estoppel Ahead: Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 32
Lov. L.A. L. REv. 461, 474-95 (1999) (discussing history and purpose of judicial
estoppel); Kimberly Jane Houghton, Comment, Having Total Disability and Claim-
ing It, Too: The EEOC's Position Against the Use of Judicial Estoppel in Americans with
Disabilities Act Cases May Hurt More than It Helps, 49 ALA. L. REv. 645, 650 (1998)
(discussing purposes ofjudicial estoppel). Judicial estoppel has been applied in a
variety of contexts, but as commentators and courts have noted, decisions that use
judicial estoppel usually have the following five factors present:
(1) The two positions must be taken by the same party; (2) the positions
must be taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3)
the record of the two proceedings must clearly reflect that the party to be
estopped intended the triers of fact to accept the truth of the facts al-
leged in support of the positions; (4) the party taking the positions must
have been succeeded in maintaining the first position and must have re-
ceived some benefit thereby in the first proceeding; (5) the two positions
must be totally inconsistent.
Muellner v. Mars, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 351,357 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (quoting Department of
Trans. v. Grawe, 447 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)). See Hamilton, supra note
2, at 135 (discussing use of estoppel); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 357 (citing Muellner
to summarize traditional elements present when judicial estoppel is invoked).
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quiry to determine whether the courts should estop a plaintiff from
asserting conflicting positions. 39 First, the plaintiff must actually assert in-
consistent positions. 40 Second, the plaintiff must have made the inconsis-
tency in "bad faith-i.e., with intent to play fast and loose with the
court."
4 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's most sig-
nificant application of judicial estoppel to an ADA claim occurred in
McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc.
42 In that case, the plaintiff was HIV positive.
43
The employer stated that the employee was dismissed because he had
taken cash from the store register.44 After McNemar was dismissed, he
applied for and received Social Security benefits, NewJersey state disability
payments and a disability exemption from his student loan from the Penn-
sylvania Higher Education Agency. 45 In his effort to receive these bene-
fits, McNemar and his physicians swore "under penalty of perjury that he
has been totally and permanently disabled and unable to work" for a pe-
riod beginning five weeks before his dismissal.
46
The Third Circuit used judicial estoppel to uphold the lower court's
granting of summary judgment in favor of the employer.4 7 The court
found that the purpose of judicial estoppel is "to protect the integrity of
the courts" and believed estoppel was needed in cases like McNemar's to
39. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 618 (discussing Ryan test); Krouse, 126 F.3d at 501
(citing Third Circuit's two-part test for use of judicial estoppel); Ryan Operations
G.P. v. Santium-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 1996) (articulating
two part analysis to be used in Third Circuit judicial estoppel cases); Scarano v.
Central R.R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953) (establishing concern of liti-
gants "playing 'fast and loose with the courts'").
40. See Ryan, 81 F.3d at 361 (developing test).
41. Id. According to the Third Circuit, "O]udicial estoppel, sometimes called
the 'doctrine against the assertion of inconsistent positions,' is a judge-made doc-
trine .... It is not intended to eliminate all inconsistencies, however slight or
inadvertent; rather, it is designed to prevent litigants from 'playing 'fast and loose
with the courts."" Id. at 358 (citing Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513).
42. 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
43. See id. at 613 (discussing facts of case).
44. See id. at 614-15 (showing formal company policy of discharge for such
infractions, and statement from high ranking personnel officers "that McNemar
should not be penalized less severely than other employees in similar situations
simply because of his disclosure [that he was HIV positive]").
45. See id. at 615-16 (noting statements made in connection with applications
for all three programs).
46. See id. at 615 (stating his doctors indicated that he was totally disabled and
unable to work for period beginning five weeks before his discharge).
47. See id. at 617 (upholding district court's use of estoppel because its use was
within the court's discretion); McNemar v. Disney Stores, Inc., No. CIV.A. 94-6997,
1995 WL 390051, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1995) (stating "it is the province of the
legislature rather than this Court to authorize such a double recovery .... This
Court fails to understand how the ADA's goals would be thwarted by rejecting the
principles ofjudicial estoppel in this case.").
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prevent plaintiffs from "'speak[ing] out of both sides of [their] mouth
with equal vigor and credibility before [the] court."' 48
The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case
because the assertions made under the disability statutes indicating an in-
ability to work showed that the plaintiff was not a "qualified" individual
under the ADA. 49 Further, the court believed that the purpose of the disa-
bility statute was not to give benefits to individuals who were capable of
working and providing for themselves. 50 Also, the court rejected the no-
tion that there was a significant difference in the definitions of disability
under the statutes.5 ' The court put little weight on the fact that AIDS was
a "presumptive disability" or the fact that no fact-sensitive investigation
into the plaintiff's condition or job requirements were necessary under
the SSA. 52 Instead, the court emphasized the fact that the plaintiff had
made his previous statements of his inability to work to the United States,
48. McNemar, 91 F.3d at 616, 618 (quoting Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan,
859 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C. 1994)).
49. See id. at 618-19 (upholding district court's finding that plaintiff failed to
make prima facie case). In invoking judicial estoppel, the court noted that it had
not had the opportunity to invoke the doctrine in an ADA claim. See id. (noting
that Third Circuit had not previously applied judicial estoppel to similar facts).
The court, however, agreed with the district court that at that time, "'most federal
courts agree that an employee who represents on a benefits application that he is
disabled is judicially estopped from arguing that he is qualified to perform the
duties of the position involved."' Id. at 618 (quoting McNemar, 1995 WL 390051, at
*3). The court relied on several other federal cases that supported its use ofjudi-
cial estoppel. See id. at 619 (listing other decisions that supported use of judicial
estoppel in context of ADA claims); August v. Offices Unlimited., Inc., 981 F.2d
576, 582-84 (1st Cir. 1992) (denying plaintiff opportunity to claim to be "qualified
individual" after claiming to be "totally disabled" in applying for disability bene-
fits); Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, 873 F. Supp. 547, 554 (D. Kan. 1995) (estopping
ADA claim after plaintiff applied for long-term disability benefits); Kennedy v. Ap-
plause, Inc., No. CV 94-5344, 1994 WL 740765, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1994)
(estopping plaintiff who claimed to be completely disabled); Reigel, 859 F. Supp.
at 967-70 (estopping plaintiff under ADA claim because of previous assertion of
disability). The court found little significance in a case relied upon by the plaintiff
to prevent invocation of judicial estoppel. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 619 n.8 (re-
jecting Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992) where court refused to
preclude plaintiffs claim under Rehabilitation Act of being qualified to work de-
spite prior SSA determination). The court noted that the present case was distin-
guishable from Overton because there was evidence that the plaintiff in Overton had
actually worked despite the disability and because Overton did not expressly deal
with judicial estoppel. See id. (finding little precedential value in Overton). More
important, the court found Overton to be of little value because the Seventh Circuit
subsequently invoked judicial estoppel in another similar case. See id. (citing
DeGuiseppe v. Village of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 191-92 (7th Cir. 1995)).
50. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 620 (finding no indication that Congress or New
Jersey legislature intended to give disability benefits to those who could work and
any "double recovery" should be authorized by legislation).
51. See id. (rejecting argument that definitions of disability are different).
52. See id. (finding presumptions irrelevant because plaintiff still had to say
"under penalty of perjury that he was physically unable to work").
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10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss4/2
2000] CASEBRIEF
New Jersey and Pennsylvania governments all under the threat of
perjury.
53
The decision in McNemar generated a considerable amount of criti-
cism from academics and other circuits.5 4 Generally, the decision was per-
ceived to adopt a per se rule that individuals claiming some sort of total
disability were judicially estopped from making their prima facie case of
being a "qualified individual" under the ADA.5 5 As a result, district courts
throughout the Third Circuit upheld McNemar as the law, but many courts
factually distinguished the cases. 56 This was especially true after the Court
53. See id. (stressing penalty of perjury as justification for estoppel).
54. See Rascon v. US West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1330-32
(10th Cir. 1998) (noting McNemar, but refusing to adoptjudicial estoppel); Krouse
v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 502-03 n.3 (3d Cir. 1997) (showing
McNemar has been subject of considerable criticism); Swanks v. Washington Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (disagreeing with Third
Circuit's reasoning); Smith v. Lindenmeyr Paper Co., No.CIV.A. 95-3973, 1997 WL
312077, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1997) (noting criticism of decision and believ-
ing Third Circuit will soon readdress issue); EEOC, supra note 3, at 5425 (finding
McNemar holding "especially troubling"); Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at
670 (noting McNemar has been "subject to some criticism"); O'Brien, supra note 2,
at 357 (criticizing McNemar as not being consistent with use of judicial estoppel);
Solum, supra note 38, at 495 (urging Supreme Court to reject use ofjudicial estop-
pel); Westman, supra note 3, at 423-24 (analyzing why judicial estoppel should not
be used in ADA cases); Marney Collins Sims, Comment, 34 Hous. L. REV. 843, 870
(1997) (criticizing use of estoppel).
55. See Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 1997) (not-
ing perception that McNemar adopted a per se rule); Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co.,
124 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating McNemar adopted 'Judicial estoppel as a
per se bar"); Norris v. Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1418, 1441-42
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (perceiving McNemaras per se bar); EEOC, supra note 3, at 5425
(disapproving of McNemar because there was no "individualized inquiry mandated
by the ADA"); Regina M. Grattan, Putting the Remedial Back into Remedy: A Rejection of
Judicial Estoppel for ADA Claimants Receiving Social Security Disability Benefits, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 836, 838 (1998) ("The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the receipt of disability benefits automatically bars a claim under the
ADA."); Robert C. Ludolph & Barbara Eckert Buchanan, Second Thoughts on Con-
flicting Disability Representations and Handicap Claims: Heads You Win Tails You Lose,
77 MICH. Bus L.J. 1054, 1058 (1998) (comparing McNemar with other courts that
did not adopt per se rule).
56. See Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 105 F.3d 1529, 1548 (3d Cir. 1997)
(analogizing McNemar ADA use of estoppel to claim under Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act); Dayoub v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 486, 490-91 &
n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (questioning and distinguishing case from McNemar); Daliessio
v. Depuy, Inc., No.CIV.A. 96-5295, 1998 WL 24330, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 1998)
(casting doubt as to validity of McNemar); Mensah v. Resources for Human Dev.,
No. 97-2517, 1997 WL 792901, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1997) (distinguishing
McNemar); Marsaglia v. L. Beinhauer & Son, Co., 987 F. Supp. 425, 429-30 nn.4-5
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (upholding use ofjudicial estoppel while also taking into account
concerns that are basis of criticism); Lindenmeyr Paper Co., 1997 WL 312077, at
*4 & n.5 (upholding use of judicial estoppel because of McNemar holding, even
though criticism of McNemarwas noted); DeJoy v. Comcast Cable Communications
Inc., 968 F. Supp. 963, 983 (D.N.J. 1997) (following McNemar, but did not invoke
judicial estoppel because facts were different); Erit v. Judge, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 774,
779 (D.N.J. 1997) (preventing inconsistent statements by using judicial estoppel).
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit later, in dicta, expressed concern that the
criticism of McNemar may suggest that the case was wrongly decided and
that the court should re-evaluate the issue as soon as possible.
57
III. RECENT CASES
A. The U.S. Supreme Court's Stance
Due to the disagreement among the circuits and the criticism of deci-
sions like McNemar, the United States Supreme Court finally settled the
issue of how to apply judicial estoppel under the ADA in Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems Corp.58 The case settles any conflict among the circuits




Carolyn Cleveland worked at Policy Management Systems. 6 1 Her job
was to do background checks on prospective employees. 62 Cleveland suf-
fered a stroke, which injured her memory, concentration and speaking
skills. 63 She took a leave of absence and three weeks later applied for
SSDI payments, claiming to be unable to work.64 Approximately three
months later her condition improved and her physician cleared her to
return to work; at which time, she began to work for Policy Management
again.65 She reported this development to the Social Security Administra-
tion.6 6 Three months later, her application was denied because she had
57. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 502-03 (noting criticism of McNemar, but refusing to
address issue of whether it was correctly decided, because plaintiff did not need to
prove he was "qualified individual"). The opinion stated 'Judge Becker is per-
suaded by the authorities [criticizing McNemar] that McNemar was wrongly decided,
and believes that the court should reconsider it at its first opportunity." Id. at 503
n.4. After Krouse, several district court opinions questioned whether McNemar was
still good law. See Dayoub, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 490 ("[The] Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has cast doubt on the continuing validity of McNemar."); Daliessio,
1998 WL 24330, at *6 (casting doubt on McNemar after Krouse).
58. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
59. See id. at 800 (granting certiorari to settle "disagreement among the Cir-
cuits about the legal effect upon an ADA suit of the application for, or receipt of,
disability benefits").
60. See Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at 666 ("Although [the prior cir-
cuits' tests] may have been effectively overruled by Cleveland, [the prior ap-
proaches] nevertheless provide a preview as to how the courts of appeals may
determine when a plaintiffs explanation is 'sufficient' [under Cleveland].").
61. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 799 (discussing facts of case); Employment: Other-
wise Qualified, 23 MENTAL & PH-isicAL DISAaIL-rv L. REP. 532, 532-33 (1999) (dis-
cussing facts and holding of case) [hereinafter Employment].
62. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 799 (noting plaintiff began job in August).
63. See id. (stating stroke occurred on Jan. 7, 1994).
64. See id. (claiming to be "disabled" and "unable to work").
65. See id. (noting plaintiffs improved condition).
66. See id. (noting disclosure two weeks after plaintiff returned to work).
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begun working again. 67 Four days after the denial of social security bene-
fits, Policy Management fired her.
68
Two months after the dismissal, Cleveland asked the Social Security
Administration to reconsider her application. 69 She stated, "I was termi-
nated due to my condition and I have not been able to work since. I con-
tinue to be disabled."70 She also noted that she tried to return to work for
a brief time, but "Policy Management Systems terminated her because she
'could no longer do the job' in light of her 'condition.' 71 Ultimately,
Cleveland was awarded benefits retroactively to the day she had the
stroke. 72 Two weeks before the Social Security Administration made the
benefits decision, Cleveland filed an ADA lawsuit claiming "Policy Manage-
ment Systems had 'terminat[ed]' her employment without reasonably 'ac-
commodat[ing] her disability.' 73 Specifically, she stated that she had
asked for additional training and extra time to complete her work, but
that the employer denied these requests.
74
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
refused to hear the merits of Cleveland's ADA claim because the court felt
her application and receipt of SSDI benefits demonstrated that she was
totally disabled. 75 Therefore, she was estopped from claiming she was a
"qualified individual" who could perform the "essential functions" of the
job.76 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the granting of summary judgment in favor of the employer. 77 The stan-
dard used by the court was that an application for disability benefits cre-
ates a "rebuttable presumption that the claimant ... is judicially estopped
from asserting that he is a 'qualified individual with a disability.'"7 8 The
court noted that the continued claims of total disability created this pre-
sumption, and Cleveland failed to produce any evidence to rebut that pre-
67. See id. (discussing facts of case).
68. See id. (noting plaintiffs dismissal).
69. See id. (noting plaintiff's new statement).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. (noting SSA's granting of disability benefits to Cleveland).
73. Id.
74. See id. (discussing which reasonable accommodations Cleveland was
denied).
75. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 519 (5th Cir. 1997),
affg Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 3:95-CV-2140-H. (N.D. Tex. 1997), va-
cated by 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
76. See id. at 518-19 (affirming district court holding that granted summary
judgment against plaintiff because she failed to show she was "qualified individual"
under ADA).
77. See id. at 519 (affirming analysis of district court).
78. Id. at 518.
2000]
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sumption. 79 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the
proper use of judicial estoppel in an ADA case.8 0
2. Analysis
A unanimous United States Supreme Court held that the presumptive
rule developed by the Fifth Circuit was incorrect.a' The Court believed
that the negative presumption was the result of the lower court's belief
that the Social Security statute and the ADA could not comfortably exist
side by side because they "inherently conflict."8 2 The Supreme Court felt
otherwise and stated there are several reasons why the two statutes can
"comfortably exist side by side" and are not "wholly inconsistent," there-
fore concluding that the negative presumption leading to judicial estoppel
was incorrect.
8 3
The first reason proffered by the Court was that the determination of
whether an individual qualifies for Social Security disability benefits does
not take into account reasonable accommodations that an employer could
make which would enable a disabled person to continue working.8 4 An
ADA claim, however, does look at whether the employee could perform
the essential functions of his or her job with reasonable accommoda-
tions.85 Therefore, "an ADA suit claiming that the plaintiff can perform
herjob with reasonable accommodation may well prove consistent with an
SSDI claim that the plaintiff could not perform her own job (or other
jobs) without it."
86
Secondly, the Court believed that the highly impersonal and formal
way in which SSDI claims are administered showed that the statutes are
79. See id. ("Cleveland continuously and unequivocally represented to the SSA
that she is totally disabled and completely unable to work. As her statements are
unambiguous and previously uncontroverted, she cannot now be heard to com-
plain that she could perform the essential functions of her job.").
80. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 800 (granting certi-
orari to settle disagreement among circuits).
81. See id. at 802-03 (holding courts should not apply any type of presumption
in cases like Cleveland).
82. See id. at 802 (explaining reasoning for lower court's use of estoppel, that
plaintiff is making inherently contradictory statements, namely "I am too disabled
to work" and "I am not too disabled to work").
83. See id. at 802-03 (stating "there are too many situations in which a SSDI
claim and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side").
84. See id. at 803 (noting reasonable accommodation language present in
ADA claims, but not necessary in SSDI determination); see also Employment, supra
note 61, at 533 (explaining justifications used by Court); Disability Estoppel Rule
Rejected, 14 FED. LITIGATOR 170 (1999) (discussing reasoning of Court); EEOC,
supra note 3, at 5426-28 (urging same rationale prior to Supreme Court decision);
Selected Labor & Employment Law Updates 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 369, 369-70
(1999) (discussing holding and rationale of Court) [hereinafter Employment Law
Updates].
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (9) (B) (1994) (listing possible examples of reasona-
ble accommodations for ADA claims).
86. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803.
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not necessarily inconsistent.8 7 As already discussed, the five-step process
of a SSDI application is very categorical and does not involve individual-
ized assessments of a person's particular disabilities or of the individual's
particular job requirements.88 The large number of SSDI applications re-
quires such a process, but the simplification is different than the highly
fact-specific application of an ADA claim.89
The Court went on to stress that disability benefits can continue even
after an individual has returned to work.9 0 Accordingly, the payment of
benefits does not always mean an individual is, or is claiming to be, totally
unable to work.9 1 Also, the Court noted that an individual's disability
might worsen over time.92 Therefore, a person who seeks disability bene-
fits may make statements that do not reflect his or her condition at the
time of the earlier employment decision bringing rise to the ADA claim.
9 3
The Court thought these were also justifications as to why statements
made under a disability application do not "inherently conflict" with an
ADA prima facie case.
9 4
Finally, the Court reasoned that when an individual has merely ap-
plied for, but has not received any disability payment, the alleged inconsis-
tencies are just a normal part of the legal system.9 5 Rules of civil
procedure allow a party to set forth several different claims in order to
seek a remedy.96 Parties are often allowed to argue in the alternative or
87. See id. at 804 (noting the presumptions and procedures used by SSA are
further examples of how benefits applications can "comfortably exist" and are not
"inherently inconsistent" with ADA claims).
88. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2000) (developing five-step procedure to be
used by SSA which includes list of "presumptive disabilities" that do not require
factual inquiries into applicant's particular characteristics).
89. See EEOC, supra note 3, at 5424 ("Unlike the definitions under other stat-
utory and contractual schemes, which permit generalized inquiries, the definition
of 'qualified individual with a disability' under the ADA always requires an individ-
ualized inquiry into the ability of a particular person to meet the requirements of a
particular position."); Employment, supra note 61, at 533 (discussing rationale of
Court).
90. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 422(c), 423(e) (1) (1994) (allowing Social Security bene-
fits to continue during "trial work" period); Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805 (noting pos-
sibility of individuals receiving benefits while also being gainfully employed).
91. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805 (stating "the SSA sometimes grants SSDI
benefits to individuals, who not only can work, but are working").
92. See id. (noting timing is factor that can allow plaintiff to receive SSDI ben-
efits, while also holding valid ADA claim).
93. See id. (noting change in condition is possible reason why statutes can
coexist).
94. See id. (giving justifications why ADA claim can coexist with disability
benefits).
95. See id. (stating alternative theories are normal part of American legal
system).
96. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (2) (permitting party to "set forth two or more
statements of a claim or defense alternatively ... [and] state as many separate
claims or defenses as the party has regardless of consistency").
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hypothetically.9 7 Therefore, there should be no different rule when par-
ties are arguing for disability payments and, in the alternative, for a rem-
edy of an ADA violation.
98
As a result, the Court concluded that there should neither be a per se
use of judicial estoppel nor should there even be a rebuttable presump-
tion in this type of ADA case.99 The Court did conclude, however, that the
plaintiff could not simply ignore the previous statement made regarding
the disability benefits.' 00 Instead, the plaintiff must offer a "sufficient ex-
planation" to resolve the contradiction.10 ' Otherwise, claiming to be "to-
tally disabled" without an explanation would negate an essential element
of the plaintiffs prima facie case.
102
According to the Court, "[t]o defeat summary judgment, that expla-
nation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that,
assuming the truth of, or the plaintiffs good faith belief in, the earlier
statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless 'perform the essential func-
tions' of herjob, with or without 'reasonable accommodation."' 103 Specif-
ically, Cleveland's brief stated that the prior statements "'were made in a
forum which does not consider the effect that reasonable workplace ac-
commodations would have on the ability to work."'" 0 4 Also, Cleveland ex-
plained that at the time the statements were made, she was totally
disabled, but that was not the case at the time of the employment deci-
sion. 10 5 The Court remanded the case under this standard to give the
parties the opportunity to contest these two explanations of the
inconsistency, 106
B. The Third Circuit's Interpretation
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently had
the opportunity to apply Cleveland to another ADA case in Motley v. New
97. See id. (allowing alternative pleadings).
98. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805 (ruling ADA/SSDI alternative theories
should be no different than normal civil pleadings).
99. See id. (refusing to adopt any sort of legal presumption in ADA cases in-
volving plaintiffs who receive Social Security benefits).
100. See id. at 805-06 (explaining that in some situations benefits application
statement may turn out to actually contradict ADA).
101. See id. at 804-06 (requiring explanation sufficient enough to explain in-
consistency and survive summary judgment).
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (placing burden on plaintiff to prove he
or she is qualified individual capable of performing essential function ofjob with
or without reasonable accommodations).
103. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807.
104. Id.
105. See id. (stating truth of benefits statements at time of application, but not
necessarily true prior to that at time of termination).
106. See id. (remanding case to determine case on merits); Cleveland v. Policy
Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 195 F.3d 803, 803 (5th Cir. 1999) (remanding case to district
court).
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Jersey State Police.10 7 The court found that the plaintiff had failed to offer a
sufficient explanation for the inconsistent statements to survive summary
judgment.
1. Facts of Motley
Motley was a NewJersey State Police Officer who was injured in 1990
when an accused drug dealer dragged him 150 feet with his car and then
crashed into a pole after a drug bust had gone astray. Motley was put on
limited duty due to his injuries Prior to his injuries, Motley had been pro-
moted to Detective II in 1989.
NewJersey mandates that all its officers take an annual physical exam-
ination.10 8 A poor performance in a physical examination prevents of-
ficers from being promoted. 10 9 After the injuries to his knees, back, neck,
shoulder and eye, Motley never performed successfully at a physical exami-
nation.1 10 As a result, Motley never received a promotion to Detective I.
Motley filed a grievance because he was not recommended for promotion
in 1991. Nothing ever came of that grievance, however, and he was not
recommended for a promotion again in 1992 or 1993.
At this time, Motley tried to obtain an accidental disability pension.
NewJersey grants this benefit if a police officer can get a medical board to
state that the officer is "permanently and totally disabled ... and ...
physically incapacitated for the performance of his usual duties."1 1 ' Mot-
ley succeeded in obtaining the disability pension because a medical board
stated that he was both permanently and totally disabled and unable to
perform the duties of a New Jersey State Police Officer. 1 2 After obtaining
the disability pension, Motley commenced an action under the ADA and
New Jersey's equivalent state provision.1 1 3 The district court, however,
found that Motley was judicially estopped from claiming he was qualified
for the job because of his previous statements made to obtain the disability
pension.
1 14
107. 196 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 1999).
108. See id. (noting purpose of exam is to be able to handle violent
confrontations).
109. See id. (stating temporary disabilities were decided on case-by-case basis).
110. See id. (indicating plaintiffs failure of exam or refusal to participate).
111. Id. (quoting NewJersey statute); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:5a-10 (West 1986)
(setting out requirements for retirement benefits to New Jersey State Police Of-
ficers injured on the job, including a medical determination that applicant is "per-
manently and totally disabled").
112. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 163 (noting continued payment of benefits to
plaintiff).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994) (stating general rule of employment under
ADA); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1, 4.1 (West 1986) (creating New Jersey "Law
Against Discrimination" and including prohibitions of discrimination against
handicapped persons in employment).
114. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 162 (affirming district court's decision to grant
summary judgment).
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2. Analysis
A majority of the appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling.
The opinion stated that though the plaintiff was not estopped from bring-
ing the claim, the defendant was simply not entitled to survive summary
judgment.1
15
The court took the opportunity to discuss the implication of its prior
holding in McNemar.' 6 The court noted the criticism McNemar had re-
ceived from courts and commentators because the decision was taken to
stand for a per se application of judicial estoppel in ADA cases where a
plaintiff had previously claimed to be totally disabled and unable to
work. l1 7 The court indicated that such a reading of McNemar was incor-
rect; the holding was meant to follow the traditional two-part test of judi-
cial estoppel and "each case [should] be decided on its own particular
facts and circumstances."" 8 Nevertheless, the opinion clarified that Cleve-
land has settled any controversy over a per se rule and has shown that
judicial estoppel should not be used. The question of whether sufficient
explanations exist for apparent inconsistencies shall be made on a case-by-
case basis.' 19
The Cleveland holding has been interpreted and applied to all types of
disability statutes, not just to Social Security applications.' 20 In Motley, the
Cleveland holding was applied to a New Jersey law that granted disability
payments to police officers who were unable to perform their previous
duties due to job-related injuries.' 2 ' The court focused the majority of its
analysis on the fact that Cleveland stands for the proposition that differ-
ences in statutory standards alone will not suffice to explain inconsistent
115. See id. (declining to use judicial estoppel, instead using traditional sum-
maryjudgement analysis); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 374 (noting Cleveland's holding
requires only sufficient explanation to survive traditional notions of summary judg-
ment); Employment Law Updates, supra note 84, at 371 (describing holding of Cleve-
land as preventing use or presumptions under judicial estoppel, but requiring
sufficient explanations under summary judgment standard).
116. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 163-64.
117. See id. at 163 (discussing reasons for criticism and citing Krouse v. Ameri-
can Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 502 n.3 (3d Cir. 1997)). For a discussion of the
criticism received by the McNemar decision, see supra notes 54-57 and accompany-
ing text.
118. Motley, 196 F.3d at 163 ("We stated that the application should not be
formulaic, but should follow the framework set out in our decisions, most notably
in Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996).").
119. See id. at 164 n.4 (indicating Cleveland as governing standard).
120. See Peggy R. Mastroianni, Instructions for Field Offices: Analyzing ADA
Charges After Supreme Court Decisions Addressing "Disabilities" and "Qualified", 615 PLI/
LIT. 313, 332 (1999) ("The analysis by the Supreme Court to compare an applica-
tion for SSDI benefits and a CP's claim that s/he is 'qualified' also would apply to
applications for other types of disability benefits, such as Long Term Disability
benefits or workers' compensation.").
121. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 53:5A-10(a) (West 1994) (granting benefits to hand-
icapped state troopers).
[Vol. 45: p. 627
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statements.1 22 Instead, there must be an additional justification for the
difference in context-related legal conclusions that appear to contradict
each other. 123 The court also focused on the fact that Motley's injuries
were extremely detailed and his assertion of being "totally and perma-
nently disabled" was "not a mere blanket statement of complete disability
checked on a box in order to obtain pension benefits."1 24 Additionally,
the court noted that a medical board examined and diagnosed Motley as
being "totally and permanently incapacitated for police officer duties."
125
The attainment of benefits is certainly evidence that an individual has
not made a prima facie showing under the ADA.' 26 The difference in
statutory standards alone will not rebut that evidence, and Motley failed to
offer any additional support to sufficiently explain the discrepancy.
127
The court also noted that Cleveland only applies to context-related legal
conclusions and that any contradictions of purely factual assertions can be
estopped.
128
The dissent agreed with the standard used by the majority, but con-
cluded there was enough evidence to allow the claim to continue. 129 Spe-
cifically, Motley continued to work as a detective for nearly three years
after the injury.130 The dissent also felt that too much weight was placed
122. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 165 (discussing Cleveland). The court stated:
Cleveland noted that her initial statements were "made in a forum that
does not consider the effect that reasonable workplace accommodations
would have on the ability to work." Obviously, this is true in all of these
cases and, if this argument alone allowed ADA plaintiffs who had previ-
ously applied for SSDI-type benefits to survive summary judgment, sum-
mary judgment could never be granted. Because the Supreme Court
indicated that summary judgment would indeed be appropriate in some
cases, an ADA plaintiff must, in certain circumstances, provide some addi-
tional rational to explain the plaintiffs apparent about-face concerning
the extent of the injuries.
Id. (citation omitted).
123. See id. (discussing what constitutes "sufficient explanation" under
Cleveland).
124. Id. at 167.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 165-66 (showing plaintiff must be able to prove he or she is
"qualified individual" and capable of performing "the essential functions" ofjob);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
127. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 166 (distinguishing Motley's case from Cleveland
because Cleveland did not offer additional support for discrepancies).
128. See id. at 164 (noting Cleveland is limited to apparently contradictory legal
conclusions, "namely, 'I am disabled for purpose of the [disability statute] "'). Pure
factual assertions fall under previous case law and are prohibited under judicial
estoppel. See id. at 167 (noting purely factual findings can be estopped); Mitchell
v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6-8 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing Cleve-
land and judicial estoppel).
129. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 168 (agreeing that judicial estoppel no longer ap-
plies, just summary judgment).
130. See id. at 170 n.6 (noting evidence that Motley performed detective du-
ties in "superior fashion").
2000]
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on the medical board.1 3 1 Most important, the dissent felt that the plaintiff
was not given the opportunity to offer other explanations for the inconsis-
tencies. The dissent would have remanded the case and allowed Motley to
argue other reasons for the inconsistent statements that would be consis-
tent with the standards set out by the court.'3 2 Remanding the case would
have been consistent with the action taken by the Supreme Court in
Cleveland. 1
33
IV. ANALYsis AND PRACTrrIONER'S GUIDE
Commentators have noted that the different pre-Cleveland uses of ju-
dicial estoppel among the circuits will indicate how the varying courts will
determine whether a plaintiff has offered a sufficient explanation for the
inconsistent statements after Cleveland.'5 4 Courts like the Third Circuit,
which previously had a strict defendant-friendly standard, will look closely
at whether a plaintiff has offered a sufficient explanation for the inconsis-
tency. 13 5 Motley clearly established that the Third Circuit requires ajustifi-
cation that goes beyond a mere difference in statutory standards.'
36
The first step practitioners should take in cases where an ADA plain-
tiff has previously claimed to be disabled is to examine the application for
disability benefits. 137 The tests under Motley and Cleveland apply to several
types of disability programs.' 38 SSI, SSDI, workers' compensation or any
type of long-term disability benefits will trigger this analysis.' 3 9 In examin-
131. See id. at 171 n.8 (noting differences in statutory standards diminishes
weight of medical board's finding).
132. See id. at 169 (believing remand case would be proper).
133. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 807 (1999) (re-
manding case).
134. See Mariani & Robertson, supra note 1, at 666 (noting that implication of
prior cases and divergent circuit views will effect application of Cleveland); see also
Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1999) (adopting
Cleveland but distinguishing case because inconsistent statement was purely factual
statement); Feldman v. American Mem'l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783, 789 (7th Cir.
1999) (adopting Cleveland while upholding summary judgment because plaintiff
failed to sufficiently explain inconsistencies); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc.,
188 F.3d 944, 955 (8th Cir. 1999) (allowing plaintiff's claim to continue);Jammer
v. School Dist., No. 978663, 1999 WL 1073688 at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 1999)
(granting summary judgment after Cleveland because of analysis used in Motley).
135. See, e.g., Motley, 196 F.3d at 166 (requiring more than difference in statu-
tory standards for sufficient explanations).
136. See id. (applying United States Supreme Court rule); see also Taylor v.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Cleveland case in
different context); Donahue v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 476, 479-80
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (refusing to dismiss plaintiffs claim because plaintiff offered suffi-
cient explanation).
137. See Mastroianni, supra note 120, at 332 (giving practical guide to attor-
neys facing problem).
138. See id. at 331 (indicating analysis applies beyond Social Security benefits).
139. See id. (discussing other contexts in which summary judgment issue of
inconsistent statements arise); see also Motley, 196 F.3d at 164 (applying analysis
beyond SSDI benefits to disability retirement program for police officers); EEOC,
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ing the disability application, practitioners should determine what the in-
dividual has actually claimed.1 40 The case law is binding only when an
individual has claimed a "total and permanent" inability to work.1 4 1 If a
plaintiff has not made such a significant statement, then there is no incon-
sistency with subsequently claiming to be a "qualified individual ... who
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the job."
1 42
Once the previous statement by the plaintiff is of such a nature that
there is at least an apparent conflict, then the statutory standards need to
be examined. 143 Normally the standards will be different because a bene-
fits program does not take into account whether the plaintiff "could per-
form the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodations." 144 The difference will need to be articulated to sup-
port the notion that the two statutes and statements can coexist side by
side. 14 5 After Motley, the different standards alone will not sufficiently jus-
tify the apparent inconsistencies between the statements, but it is never-
theless necessary to articulate to a court why the statutes can coexist.
146
The next step is to look at how the application for the benefits actu-
ally occurred. 147 If the plaintiff was "merely checking the boxes" on a
form, then there is probably a basis for surviving summary judgment and
letting the fact finder determine the ADA claim.14 8 If, however, there are
supra note 3, 5418-24 (analyzing several types of disability programs and their simi-
lar effect on ADA claims).
140. See Mastroianni, supra note 120, at 332 ("Determine if there appears to
be any discrepancies between claims made on the application and the [appli-
cant's] contention that s/he is 'qualified.'").
141. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 163 (showing plaintiff had previously claimed to
be "permanently and totally disabled ... and ... physically incapacitated for the
performance of his usual duties").
142. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
143. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S 802-05 (1999) (explain-
ing how Social Security and ADA statutes differ in statutory definitions).
144. See id. at 802-03 (discussing difference in statutory definitions); EEOC,
supra note 3, at 1518-24 (discussing how statutory standards of Social Security Act,
workers' compensation laws and disability benefits programs differ from ADA).
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 423(a) (1) (1994) (defining disability under Social Security
Act), with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (requiring analysis into "reasonable accommoda-
tion" in defining "qualified individual" under ADA).
145. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802 (discussing why statutes do not "inherently
conflict"); Feldman v. American Mem'l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.
1999) (discussing Supreme Court's justifications for why statutes can coexist); Mas-
troianni, supra note 120, at 332 (giving practical advice).
146. See, e.g., Motley, 196 F.3d at 165 (noting difference in standards alone is
not sufficient to explain inconsistencies).
147. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 804 (discussing generalizations of SSDI applica-
tions to insure administrative efficiency).
148. See Mastroianni, supra note 120, at 332 ("[1]n finding a [plaintiff] to be
'qualified,' greater weight should be given to a [plaintiff's] narrative description of
his/her disability and ability to work on a benefits application form than informa-
tion captured when a [plaintiff] checked off a box.").
20001
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very fact specific allegations made by the plaintiff, another explanation
must be offered. 149 Checking boxes will likely occur if the previous state-
ment was made on a Social Security application. 150 The "listed" disabili-
ties (i.e., AIDS) do not require any fact-specific analysis. 1 5 1 The individual
automatically receives the benefit, and there is no analysis into that per-
son's level of incapacity or actual work duties. 152 This distinction was what
prevented the plaintiff in Motley from succeeding. 153 He made detailed
descriptions of the severity of his injuries. 154 Also, he had a medical diag-
nosis that he was incapable of performing the duties of a police officer.155
A plaintiff whose ADA claim is based on an allegation that the em-
ployer denied a request for reasonable accommodation will have a strong
argument to survive summary judgement.15 6 A plaintiff who simply al-
leges a wrongful termination or an unlawful denial of promotion will have
a weaker argument. 157 If the plaintiff's cause of action is based specifically
149. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 166 (distinguishing case because plaintiff "offered
detailed descriptions of his injuries and their impact on his ability to work"). The
court noted, "to the extent that Motley now wishes to contest the purely factual
findings regarding his physical condition, as opposed to conclusions that he was
completely disabled for purposes of working as a state police officer, Cleveland
does not even apply and Motley may be precluded from asserting such a claim."
Id. at 167; see Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802-05 (barring judicial estoppel for fact-based
legal conclusions, but allowing it for pure factual assertions); Mitchell v. Washing-
ton Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6-8 (7th Cir. 1999) (stressing Clevelands rejection
of judicial estoppel is not extended to purely factual assertions).
150. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1999) (describing how Social Security Adminis-
tration shall determine validity of benefits applications).
151. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.00(D) (1999) (listing HIV
infection as example of "listed" disability).
152. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (allowing automatic granting of SSDI bene-
fits if applicant has "listed" disability).
153. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 160 (discussing plaintiffs clear claims that he had
.extremely painful recurring headaches and intense back pain . . . and could not
stand on [his left knee] without pain").
154. See id. (discussing plaintiffs failure to explain earlier statements of
disability).
155. See id. at 163 ("The medical board concurred [with Motley's assertion]
and found Motley was totally and permanently incapacitated for State Police Of-
ficer duties.").
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994) (giving examples of reasonable accom-
modations); Mastroianni, supra note 120, at 333 (discussing guide to issue). If the
plaintiff were forced to leave his or her job because of the employer's failure to
make one of these reasonable accommodations, then his or her application for
benefits is consistent with the subsequent ADA claim. See id. at 333 (giving "job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant posi-
tion, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment
or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations" as examples
of reasonable accommodations); see also Pyrcz v. Branford College, No. 981365,
1999 WL 706882, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 26, 1999) (distinguishing case from
Cleveland because plaintiff had not alleged failure to reasonably accommodate).
157. See Motley, 526 U.S. 795, 802-04 (finding plaintiff failed to offer sufficient
explanation to defeat summary judgment).
648
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss4/2
CASEBRIEF
on the employer's refusal to accommodate him or her, then his or her
subsequent application for disability payments is understandable. 158 The
individual was incapable of work, but only because of the employer's ADA
violation.
159
Finally, practitioners should determine if the plaintiff's condition has
worsened over time.160 For example, the two claims can be reconciled if
the employment decision that gave rise to the ADA claim occurred at one
time, and then later the employee's condition worsened to the point
where, at that subsequent time, he or she needed disability benefits. 161
The ADA plaintiff is seeking a remedy for a time when he did not feel he
was disabled enough to necessitate benefits.
162
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has settled the issue of which test
courts should use to determine whether an ADA claim is barred by a prior
admission of disability.' 63 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has applied this test rather strictly in accordance with its
history of judicially estopping such claims.' 64 Practitioners dealing with
inconsistent statements should look to the examples given by the court




158. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999) (explaining
why ADA claim can be consistent with SSDI application for disability).
159. See D'Aprile v. Fleet Serv. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) (giving ex-
ample of individual having to quit job because of employer's refusal to reasonably
accommodate her disability).
160. See Mastroianni, supra note 120, at 333 ("[A] statement about the [plain-
tiff's] disability on a benefits application might not reflect his/her ability to per-
form the essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation, at the
time of the Respondent's employment decision.").
161. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807 (discussing plaintiff's contention that SSDI
statements were true at time they were made); Motley, 196 F.3d at 165 (distinguish-
ing case from Cleveland where plaintiffs additional explanation was that her condi-
tion had worsened over time).
162. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. 807 (stating plaintiff's claim that at time of em-
ployment decision giving rise to ADA cause of action she was capable of working,
though she was not at time of her subsequent SSDI application).
163. See id. ("To defeat summary judgment, that explanation must be suffi-
cient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the truth of, or
plaintiff's good faith belief in the earlier statement the plaintiff could nonetheless
'perform the essential functions' of her job, with or without 'reasonable
accommodation."').
164. See Motley, 196 F.3d at 165 (requiring more explanation than mere differ-
ence in statutory standards).
165. See id. at 165, 167 (noting change in condition and blanket statements
may be sufficient explanations).
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